A (t, r)-function secret sharing ((t, r)-FSS) scheme allows a dealer to secret-share a function f among r parties as r secret keys k 1 , . . . , k r such that for any input x the parties can compute r output shares that allow the reconstruction of f (x) but any ≤ t of the parties cannot learn any information about f . FSS schemes for point functions have been constructed under the name of distributed point functions (DPFs). The existing DPFs are computationally secure and based on the existence of PRGs or OWFs. As a result, the protocols where DPFs work as building blocks are computationally secure as well. In this paper, we study information-theoretically secure (t, r)-FSS (called (t, r)-itFSS) and propose a generic transformation from information-theoretic private information retrieval (PIR) schemes to itFSS schemes for point functions. We measure the efficiency of itFSS with its communication complexity, which can be defined as the total length of the secret keys and the output shares, maximized over the choices of f and x. By instantiating the generic transformation, we obtain (t, r)-itFSS schemes for a variety of choices of (t, r), which have sublinear (in the functions' domain size) communication complexity. How to make sure that the parties' shares of f (x) do not reveal more information than what needed to compute f (x) is an interesting problem. An itFSS with this property is called function-private. In this paper, we also define a parameter called the mutual rate of itFSS in order to measure the amount of information that will be leaked by the parties' output shares. We calculate the mutual rates for several specific itFSS schemes. We also define computational function privacy and propose a 2-party itFSS scheme with computational function privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
A secret sharing (SS) scheme allows a dealer to split a secret into multiple shares such that any authorized subset of the shares can recover the secret but any unauthorized subset of the shares contains absolutely no information about the secret. The notion of secret sharing was independently introduced by [6] , [20] and then extended by [18] . Since [6] , [18] , [20] , secret sharing has been a central building block in many cryptographic and distributed applications such as information-theoretically secure multi-party computation [5] , [9] and private information retrieval [11] .
Motivated by the problem of securely searching and updating distributed data, Boyle et al. [8] introduced the notion of function secret sharing (FSS). An r-party FSS is a natural extension of secret sharing that allows one to split a function f into r function shares f 1 , . . . , f r such that: (i) for any input x,
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Remigiusz Wisniewski . r i=1 f i (x) = f (x); (ii) every function f i can be described by a short secret key k i , which enables the efficient computation of f i (x); and (iii) any proper subset of the function shares completely hides f . In particular, if the security property of (iii) is with respect to any subset of ≤ t function shares, then the FSS scheme is said to be t-secure and denoted as (t, r)-FSS. The efficiency of FSS has been measured by the total length of the secret keys, i.e., r i=1 |k i |. Minimizing the key length is a very challenging problem.
For any α ∈ {0, 1} l and β ∈ {0, 1} l , a point function f α,β : {0, 1} l → {0, 1} l is a function such that f α,β (α) = β and f α,β (α ) = 0 l for every α ∈ {0, 1} l \ {α}. Boyle et al. [8] constructed a (1,2)-FSS scheme with key length O(λl) and for any integer r ≥ 3 an (r − 1, r)-FSS scheme with key length O(λ · 2 r/2 · √ 2 l ), both for the point functions as above. The security of these FSS schemes are computational and based on the existence of pseudorandom generators (PRGs) with seed length λ. Prior to [8] , the FSS schemes for point functions have been constructed by [16] under the name of distributed point functions (DPFs). In particular, Gilboa and Ishai [16] constructed a PRG-based (1,2)-DPF (i.e., (1, 2) -FSS for point functions) with key length O(λ · l log 2 3 ), which is worse than [8] . Following the works of [8] , [16] , Boyle et al. [7] proposed multiple improvements and extensions, which include a one-way function (OWF) based (1, 2) -DPF that reduces the key size of Boyle et al. [8] roughly by a factor of 4. Apart from the point functions, FSS schemes for different functions such as the hard-core predicates of one-way functions have also been constructed using Fourier basis [21] , [22] .
FSS schemes for point functions (i.e., DPFs) have many interesting applications such as multi-server PIR, secure keyword search, and incremental secret sharing [8] . As the existing FSS schemes for point functions [7] , [8] , [16] are built on computationally secure primitives such as PRGs and OWFs, in these applications we are only able to obtain computationally secure protocols. It is interesting to consider informationtheoretically secure DPFs.
A. OUR WORK
In this paper, we study information-theoretically t-secure r-party function secret sharing ((t, r)-itFSS) schemes. Let r > t ≥ 1. A (t, r)-itFSS scheme for a function family F involves a dealer, r parties, and a reconstructor. In an execution of (t, r)-itFSS, the dealer can secret-share any function f ∈ F among the r parties by distributing a secret key to each party; given an input α from the reconstructor, each party can compute a value with both α and its secret key; and finally the reconstructor is able to compute f (α ) by using the r values from the r parties and by invoking a pre-determined output decoder. The security of (t, r)-itFSS requires that no ≤ t out of the r parties are able to learn any information about f from their secret keys, even if they have unlimited computing power. This is a main difference between itFSS and the existing works. Besides security, the output decoder of our FSS schemes may be significantly more complex than the additive ones of [7] , [8] , [16] . Due to this difference, we measure the efficiency of an itFSS with its communication complexity, which can be defined as the total length of the r secret keys to the parties and the servers' responses for computing f (α ), maximized over the choices of f and α .
Let A = [n] be a finite set and let B = F be a finite field. For any α ∈ A, we define f α,1 : A → B as a point function such that f α,1 (α) = 1 and f α,1 (α ) = 0 for any α ∈ A \ {α}. Let F A,B = {f α,1 : α ∈ A}. Our second contribution in this paper is a generic transformation from the tprivate r-server PIR ((t, r)-PIR) schemes [11] to (t, r)-itFSS schemes. A (t, r)-PIR is a communication protocol between a user and r servers, where each server has a database x = (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n and the user has a private index α ∈ [n]; it allows the user to retrieve x α from the servers but keeps α still hidden from any ≤ t servers. For any α ∈ A, let e α ∈ {0, 1} n ⊆ F n be the unit vector whose α -th entry is equal to 1 and all the other entries are equal to 0. Because f α,1 (α ) = e α [α], we observe that the problem of secret-sharing f α,1 among r parties and then performing a distributed computation of f α,1 (α ) by the r parties can be reduced to the problem of privately retrieving the α-th bit of the database e α with r servers. Our transformation is based on this critical observation. The t-security of itFSS follows from the t-privacy of PIR. The communication complexity of itFSS is dominated by that of PIR.
In order to demonstrate the generic transformation, we instantiate it with a (1, r)-PIR scheme of Chor et al. [11] and get a specific (1, r)-itFSS with communication complexity O(n 1/(r−1) ). By instantiating the generic transformation with many other existing PIR schemes [3] , [11] , [14] , [17] , we obtain (t, r)-itFSS schemes that allow a variety of choices for t, r and much better communication complexity. Some of the most efficient itFSS can be found in TABLE 1.
In particular, the most efficient (1, 2)-itFSS and (1, 3)-itFSS schemes are obtained by applying our transformation to the PIR schemes of [3] and [14] , respectively.
In itFSS, the dealer and the reconstructor may be different entities. An ideal itFSS scheme should protect the secrecy of the shared function f ∈ F not only from the r parties but also from the reconstructor. While the r values from the r parties enable the reconstruction of f (x), they may potentially reveal more information about f than what is needed to compute f (x). For example, in a trivial itFSS scheme 1 where the α is secret-shared with a traditional secret sharing scheme (such as Shamir's threshold scheme [20] ) among the r parties, each party simply provides its share of α to the reconstructor, and the reconstructor recovers α and then determines f α,1 (α ). Not only the function value f α,1 (α ) but all information about f α,1 is revealed to the reconstructor, which is too much. The existing works [7] , [8] have expected that the parties' output shares should reveal no more information about the function f than what is necessary to determine f (x). An itFSS scheme with such property is said to be function-private. A trivial itFSS scheme 2 with function privacy can be obtained by simply secret-sharing the truth table of f α,1 among the r parties using a threshold scheme such as Shamir [20] , each party providing a Shamir share of f (x) to the reconstructor, and the reconstructor recovering f (x) with polynomial interpolation. However, the communication complexity of this scheme will be O(n), which may be prohibitive for large n.
While the trivial scheme 1 has the best possible communication complexity and the worst security and the trivial scheme 2 has the worst communication complexity and the best security, our itFSS schemes from the generic transformation fall in between, both in terms of communication complexity and in terms of security. In this paper, we formally define a new parameter called the mutual rate of itFSS, in order to measure the information revealed by the parties computation results in each reconstruction. By formally calculating the mutual rates for the trivial schemes and our specific instantiation, we do confirm the above statements. For r = 2, we design a transformation that can convert a 2-server PIR to computational function-private itFSS. For the future work, it is highly interesting to design various itFSS schemes that can provide best balance between communication complexity and security.
B. RELATED WORK
Function secret sharing has close connections with private information retrieval (PIR) [11] . An r-server PIR scheme is a communication protocol between a user and r servers, where each server has a database x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n and the user has a private index α ∈ [n]. It enables the user to retrieve x α from the servers privately such that the index α is still hidden from the servers. An r-server PIR is said to be (information-theoretically) t-private if any collusion of ≤ t servers learns absolutely no information about α. The efficiency of a PIR is usually measured by its communication complexity, which can be defined as the total number of bits that should be communicated between the user and all servers, in order to retrieve one item from the database. For given parameters r and t, constructing (t, r)-PIR schemes with minimal communication complexity has been the most challenging problem in this field.
For t = 1 and r = 2, Chor et al. [11] constructed the first 2-server PIR with communication complexity O(n 1/3 ), which has been optimal for a long time. Dvir and Gopi [13] improved [11] with a 2-server PIR of communication complexity n O((log log n/ log n) 1/2 ) , which is the current record. For t = 1 and any r > 1, Ambainis [1] and Beimel et al. [4] constructed (t, r)-PIR schemes with communication complexity O(2 r 2 n 1/(2r−1) ) and n O(log log r/r log r) , respectively. By assuming the existence of infinitely many Mersenne primes, Yekhanin [24] constructed a 3-server PIR scheme with communication complexity n O(1/ log log n) . Efremenko [14] then proposed an unconditional construction of a 3-server PIR scheme, which has the best up-to-date communication complexity n O((log log n/ log n) 1/2 ) . For r > 3, Efremenko [14] also proposed an unconditional r-server PIR scheme with communication complexity n O((log log n/ log n) 1−1/ log r ) , which were then improved by Itoh and Suzuki [19] and Chee et al. [10] . For t > 1, Beimel et al. [3] and Yekhannin et al. [23] proposed (t, r)-PIR schemes with communication complexity O(n 1/ (2r−1/t) ).
C. ORGANIZATIONS
In Section II, we formally define itFSS and PIR. In Section III, we give a generic transformation from any PIR to itFSS; we also demonstrate the generic transformation with a specific instantiation; by applying the transformation to most existing PIR schemes, we get a family of itFSS schemes for various values of (t, r). In Section IV, we study the property of function privacy by defining the new parameter of mutual rate for itFSS; we also calculate the rate for our specific instantiation and determine the amount of information about f that will be revealed by the parties' computed values; we design a 2-party itFSS with computational function privacy. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
For any vector v of dimension n and any index α ∈ [n], we denote by v[α] the α-th entry of v. We denote by 0 (v) the number of entries of v that are equal to 0.
A. FUNCTION SECRET SHARING
In this section, we shall define an information-theoretic function secret sharing (itFSS) model. Let F be a function family. Let r > t ≥ 1. Informally, a t-private r-party itFSS ((t, r)-itFSS) scheme for F provides a means to split any function f ∈ F into r separate keys (one key to each of the parties {P 1 , . . . , P r }) such that: (1) for any input x, each party is able to efficiently generate an output share of f (x) with the key assigned to it; and the r parties' output shares of f (x) suffice to reconstruct f (x) efficiently; (2) any subset of ≤ t keys cannot reveal any information about which function has been shared. In particular, the reconstruction of f (x) from parties' output shares is realized with an output decoder DEC, which can be defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Output Decoder): An r-party share output decoder DEC is a tuple (S 1 , . . . , S r , R, Dec) specifying: r share spaces S 1 , . . . , S r for each of the r parties; an output space R; and a decoder function Dec : S 1 × · · · × S r → R that takes the parties' shares to an output. Definition 2 [(t, r)-itFSS]: Let F be a family of efficiently computable functions. Let r > t ≥ 1. A tsecure r-party information-theoretic function secret sharing scheme with respect to the share output decoder DEC = (S 1 , . . . , S r , R, Dec) and the function family F is a pair = (Gen, Eval) of algorithms with the following syntax:
• Gen (f ): This is a key generation algorithm. It takes any function f : D → R in the family F as input and outputs r secret keys k 1 , . . . , k r .
: This is the i-th evaluation algorithm. It takes an index i ∈ [r], a secret key k i , and a point x ∈ D as input and outputs a value y i ∈ S i , which is an output share of f (x) ∈ R. It should satisfy the following correctness and secrecy requirements:
• Correctness: This property requires that if the algorithms Gen and Eval are both faithfully executed, then the decoder function Dec will be able to reconstruct f (x) from parties' output shares of f (x). Formally, the scheme (Gen, Eval) is said to be correct if for any f ∈ F, any x ∈ D, Pr[(k 1 , . . . , k r ) ← Gen(f ) :
• t-Security: This property requires that any subset of ≤ t secret keys provide no information about f . Formally, the t-security will be defined with a standard indistinguishability experiment. For any subset T ⊆ [r] of cardinality ≤ t and any adversary A that plays the roles of the honest-but-curious parties {P i : i ∈ T }, the experiment is defined as follows: -The adversary A chooses two functions f 0 , f 1 ∈ F and gives them to the challenger; -The challenger chooses a bit b ← {0, 1} uniformly and at random; it generates r secret keys (k 1 , . . . , k r ) ← Gen(f b ) and then gives {k i } i∈T to A; -The adversary A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} of the bit b. The itFSS scheme (Gen, Eval) is said to be t-secure if for any set T ⊆ [r] of cardinality ≤ t and any adversary A, it holds that
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the challenger and A. In [8] , the t-security of an FSS scheme is computational and requires that | Pr[b = b] − 1/2| should be bounded by a negligible function in the security parameter. Compared with [8] , there are no security parameters in our itFSS and we require that | Pr[b = b] − 1/2| = 0. As there is no restriction on the computing power of the adversary A, our t-security will be information-theoretic and strictly stronger than that of [8] , which is computational and based on various cryptographic assumptions (such as the existence of one-way functions or pseudorandom generators).
Due to the information-theoretic feature, our t-security could have been defined without using the standard indistinguishability experiments. For any T ⊆ [r] and any f ∈ F, we denote by Gen T (f ) the distribution obtained by running the key generation algorithm (k 1 , . . . , k r ) ← Gen(f ) and then outputting {k i } i∈T .
Theorem 1: An r-party itFSS scheme = (Gen, Eval) is t-secure if and only if it satisfies the following property: for any T ⊆ [r] of cardinality ≤ t, for any f 0 , f 1 ∈ F, the distributions Gen T (f 0 ) and Gen T (f 1 ) are identical, i.e., Gen T (f 0 ) ≡ Gen T (f 1 ).
Proof: On one hand, suppose that for any
Then in the standard indistinguishability experiment of Definition 2, we have
which implies that is t-secure.
Conversely, suppose that is t-secure. We need to show that Gen T (f 0 ) ≡ Gen T (f 1 ) for any subset T ⊆ [r] of cardinality ≤ t and any functions f 0 , f 1 ∈ F. Let K be the set of all possible values that could be taken by the random variables Gen T (f 0 ) and Gen T (f 1 ). Assume for contradiction that
It suffices to construct an adversary A such that Pr[b = b] = 1/2 in the standard indistinguishability experiment of Definition 2. We shall define the adversary A as follows:
• The adversary A simply chooses the functions f 0 , f 1 ∈ F in Equation (1) and gives them to the challenger;
• When a value K is received from the challenger, the adversary A outputs a bit b = i K , where
Note that K and Gen T (f b ) are identically distributed. When K =k, we have i K = 0 and thus
For any k ∈ K \ {k}, we have that
Based on Equations (2) and (3), we have that
which is contradictory to the t-security of . As FSS [7] , [8] has primary applications in the construction of communication-efficient protocols, measuring the efficiency of FSS with r i=1 |k i |, the total length of the secret keys, plus r i=1 |y i |, the total length of parties' output shares should be fairly reasonable. In the existing computationally secure FSS schemes [7] , [8] , the efficiency has been mainly measured by the maximal length of the secret keys
, which usually dominates the total communication cost r i=1 (|k i | + |y i |), because an additive output decoder is used in [7] , [8] and each y i is significantly shorter than the secret keys. However, this is not always true in our itFSS as our output decoder could be more complex. Hence, we insist that the efficiency of an itFSS should be measured by its communication complexity, which will be defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Communication Complexity): The communication complexity of a (t, r)-itFSS scheme (Gen, Eval) is defined as the maximum total length of the secret keys for a function f ∈ F and parties' output shares of f (x), i.e., the maximum value of r i=1 (|k i | + |y i |), where the maximum is taken over the choices of f ∈ F and x ∈ D, and the random coins used in Gen and Eval.
1) POINT FUNCTIONS
The existing FSS schemes [7] , [8] have focused on the sharing of point functions and an r-party FSS for point functions has been called an r-party distributed point function. For any 
Informally, an r-server private information retrieval (PIR) [11] is a communication protocol between a user U and r servers S 1 , . . . , S r , where each server is storing a copy of the same database x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ). It enables the user to retrieve an item of the database (say x α for some α ∈ [n]) from the servers while hiding the identity of the item being retrieved. Specifically, in a t-private r-server PIR ((t, r)-PIR) protocol the user's privacy should be protected from any collusion of ≤ t servers, in the sense that any t out of the r servers learn no information on which item has been retrieved. Definition 5 [(t, r)-PIR]: A t-private r-server private information retrieval (PIR) scheme P = (Q, A, C) consists of three algorithms that can be defined as follows:
: This is a randomized query algorithm. It takes the parameters r, n and α as input and outputs r queries q 1 , . . . , q r , where r is the number of servers, n is the number of items in the database, and α ∈ [n] is an index. The user will run this algorithm with its choice of α to produce the r queries and then send each q j to the server S j . For every j ∈ [r], we denote by Q j (r, n, α) the j-th query (i.e., q j ) output by Q(r, n, α);
This is an answer algorithm. It takes r, j, a database x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and a query q j as input, and outputs an answer a j . For every j ∈ [r], the server S j will run this algorithm to produce the answer and then send it to the user.
• x α ← C(k, n, a 1 , . . . , a r ) : This is a reconstruction algorithm. It takes the parameters r, n and the r servers' answers a 1 , . . . , a r as input and outputs a value x α . The user will run this algorithm to extract the expected database item x α . These algorithms should satisfy the following requirements on correctness and security:
• Correctness: This property requires that the reconstruction algorithm should always output the expected item (i.e., x α ) as long as all algorithms are faithfully executed. Formally, we say that P is correct if for any integers n, r, any database x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), and an index α ∈ [n], it holds that C(r, n, a 1 , . . . , a r ) = x α .
• t-Privacy: This property requires that any collusion of ≤ t servers learn no information about the user's index. Formally, we say that P is t-private if for any integers r, n, any indices α 0 , α 1 ∈ [n], and any set T ⊆ [r] of cardinality ≤ t, the distributions Q T (r, n, α 0 ) and Q T (r, n, α 1 ) are identical. The efficiency of PIR protocols is mainly measured by their communication complexity, which is defined as the total number of communicated bits for retrieving a single item from the database.
Definition 6 (Communication Complexity): The communication complexity of the PIR scheme P = (Q, A, C) is defined as the maximum value of r i=1 |q i |+ r i=1 |a i |, where the maximum is taken over the choices of x ∈ {0, 1} n and α ∈ [n], and the random coins used by all algorithms.
III. OUR CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section, we shall propose a generic transformation from information-theoretic PIR schemes to itFSS schemes. In order to demonstrate our transformation, we also provide a specific instantiation based on the PIR schemes of Chor et al. [11] . By applying the transformation to many existing PIR schemes [3] , [11] , [14] , [17] , we get a family of FSS schemes with both information-theoretic security and sublinear communication complexity. For any α ∈ A, let e α ∈ {0, 1} n ⊆ F n be the unit vector whose α -th entry is equal to 1 and all other entries are equal to 0. Then it is easy to see that
In an execution of P where each of the r servers has a public database e α , a user with private input α ∈ [n] will run the query generation algorithm to produce r queries q 1 , . . . , q r , which allow the user to secret-share α among the r servers; for every j ∈ [r], the j-th server will produce an answer a j with q j and e α ; and finally the user is able to reconstruct e α [α] with the r answers a 1 , . . . , a r . On the other hand, what we expect is a (t, r)-itFSS scheme = (Gen, Eval) where the dealer can secret-share a private function f α,1 among r parties (servers) as k 1 , . . . , k r ; for every j ∈ [r], the j-th party (server) is able to produce a value y j with k j and α ; and finally the reconstruction algorithm can extract f α,1 (α ) from the r values y 1 , . . . , y r . Due to (4) and by comparing between the two executions, we observe that the work of evaluating a private function f α,1 at a public point α in can be reduced to the work of privately retrieving the α-th bit from a public database e α in P.
In particular, the itFSS scheme can be constructed out of P with the following idea: Let the dealer (who has a private function f α,1 ), the r parties (who have the public point α ) and the reconstructor in run the query generation algorithm Q, the answer algorithm A, and the reconstruction algorithm C, respectively. It is easy to see that the reconstructor in would be able to compute e α [α], which is f α,1 (α ), by executing C on the r parties' responses. As long as the scheme P is t-private, any ≤ t secret keys (queries) will reveal no information about α and thus no information about f α,1 . The detailed construction is described in FIGURE 1 and FIGURE 2 .
Theorem 2: If P = (Q, A, C) is a t-private r-server information-theoretic PIR scheme, then the scheme = (Gen, Eval) is a t-secure r-party itFSS scheme. Proof: It suffices to show that is both correct and t-secure. The correctness of requires that when the algorithms Gen and Eval are both faithfully executed, the decoder Dec should always output the correct function value. For any f α,1 ∈ F A,B and any α ∈ A, any (k 1 , . . . , k r ) ← Gen(f α,1 ) and any {y j ← Eval(j, k j , α )} r j=1 , we have that Dec(y 1 , . . . , y r ) = C(r, n, y 1 , . . . , y r ) = C(r, n, A(r, 1, e α , q 1 ), . . . , A(r, r, e α , q r ))
Hence, Pr[(k 1 , . . . , k r ) ← Gen(f α,1 ) : Dec (Eval(1, k 1 , α ) , . . . , Eval(r, k r , α )) = f α,1 (α )] = 1 and thus the scheme is correct.
The t-security of = (Gen, Eval) requires that any collusion of ≤ t parties learn no information of the function f α,1 ∈ F A,B . In particular, by Theorem 1, it suffices to show that for any subset T ⊆ [r] of cardinality ≤ t and any functions f α 0 ,1 , f α 1 ,1 ∈ F A,B , Gen T (f α 0 ,1 ) ≡ Gen T (f α 1 ,1 ). The construction of shows that for every i ∈ {0, 1}, Gen T (f α i ,1 ) and Q T (r, n, α i ) are identically distributed. As P is t-private, we must have that Q T (r, n, α 0 ) ≡ Q T (r, n, α 1 ). Then the expected connection Gen T (f α 0 ,1 ) ≡ Gen T (f α 1 ,1 ) follows.
1) COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY
In our construction, the communication complexity of will be the maximal value of r i=1 (|k i |+|y i |) = r i=1 (|q i |+|a i |), where the maximum is taken over the choices of f α,1 ∈ F A,B and α ∈ A. Note that the communication complexity of P is the maximum value of r i=1 (|q i | + |a i |) with the maximum taken over the choices of α ∈ A and x ∈ {0, 1} n . In particular, the range of x will cover that of e α . As a result, the communication complexity of our itFSS scheme will not exceed that of P.
2) EXTENSIONS
Our basic idea in the generic transformation of FIGURE 1 can be easily extended to construct itFSS schemes for a broader class of functions such as the multi-point functions (see FIGURE 3 ).
Definition 7 (Multi-Point Functions): For any subset α = {α 1 , . . . , α l } ⊆ A and any β ∈ B, the multi-point Proof: The proof for this theorem is an easy extension to that of Theorem 2 and omitted from here.
The construction shows that our basic idea of transforming PIR into itFSS is indeed powerful. In particular, it may have many other extensions. For example, verifiable itFSS that allows the parties to detect any deviation in executing Gen may be possible, if we start from a PIR scheme with the similar property. However, in this paper we will not cover more extensions but focus on the itFSS schemes for point functions, which have prominent importance.
B. SPECIFIC INSTANTIATION
Our generic transformation in Section III-A is applicable to most of the existing PIR schemes and yield itFSS schemes with different levels of security and different communication complexity. In this section, we shall demonstrate the transformation with a specific instantiation on the classical PIR schemes of Chor et al. [11] .
1) THE BASIC IDEA
Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n be a public database and let α ∈ [n] be any private index. Then x α = e α , x , the inner product of x and the unit vector e α . Let f α (z) = (f α 1 (z), . . . , f α n (z)) be a vector of polynomials such that f α (0) = e α . Then
will be a univariate polynomial such that F α,x (0) = e α , x = x α . The problem of privately retrieving x α can be reduced to the problem of evaluating the polynomial F α,x (z) at z = 0. In particular, if every entry of f α (z) has degree ≤ r − 1, then F α,x (z) will have degree ≤ r − 1 as well and can be interpolated from the its values at r different points. In a basic r-server PIR the user can simply send a query
to the i-th server for every i ∈ [r], the server replies with a i = F α,x (i) = q i , x , and finally the user will be able to interpolate F α,x (z) with {(i, a i )} r i=1 and output F α,x (0) = x α . Any ≤ r − 1 servers will not be able to learn e α , which gives the (r − 1)-privacy of the scheme. This (r − 1, r)-PIR scheme has communication complexity O(n) and thus is trivial.
2) THE PIR SCHEME
With an optimization of the above basic idea, Chor et al. [11] (FIGURE 4) proposed a (1, r)-PIR scheme with nontrivial communication complexity O(n 1/(r−1) ). Instead of choosing the entries of f α (z) randomly, they carefully construct these entries such that every q i in the basic scheme can be computed from a query of length O(n 1/(r−1) ), which is significantly shorter. Chor et al. [11] chose a minimal integer s such that g (z).
Then f α j (z) will be a polynomial of degree ≤ r − 1 and
. For every i ∈ [r], a query Q i = g(i) will be generated and given to the i-th server, which allows the server to compute q i = f α (i) and then replies with a i = F α,x (i). It is easy to see that any ≥ 2 of the queries {Q 1 , . . . , Q r } would completely reveal the v α . Therefore, their scheme is 1-private.
3) THE itFSS SCHEME
The (1, r)-PIR scheme of FIGURE 4 has a linear reconstruction algorithm which takes the r servers' answers a 1 , . . . , a r as input and outputs r i=1 c i a i . Our generic transformation allows us to convert it into a (1, r)-itFSS scheme with respect to a linear output decoder DEC = ((F, . . . , F), F, Dec) such that Dec(y 1 , . . . , y r ) = r i=1 c i y i (see FIGURE 5 ). The communication complexity of this (1, r)-itFSS scheme is O(n 1/r−1 ) as well. 
C. MORE INSTANTIATIONS
The reconstruction algorithms in [3] , [11] , [17] are fixed and the reconstruction algorithm in [13] , [14] relies on a parameter (aux), which is generated by the user. In the itFSS scheme obtained from the PIR scheme in [14] , the reconstructor can still learn f α,1 (α ) from the shares without this parameter if we modify the output decoder. The output decoder obtained by the generic transformation is DEC = ((F, . . . , F), F, Dec), where the decode function is Dec(y 1 , . . . , y r ) = aux · r i=1 c i y i and aux is a nonzero element in F. We can modify the decode function to Dec(y 1 , . . . , y r ) = r i=1 c i y i . Then the new decoder output a nonzero element if and only if f α,1 (α ) = 1. Since making this parameter public may lead to the disclosure of the information about f α,1 , our generic transformation is not applicable to the PIR schemes where we have to make aux public, for example, the PIR scheme in [13] .
The TABLE 2 below lists part of the existing PIR schemes and their communication complexity. By applying the generic transformation, we can obtain an itFSS scheme from each of these PIR schemes. Moreover, the constructed itFSS scheme shares the same communication complexity with the original PIR scheme.
IV. FUNCTION PRIVACY
For a point function f α,1 , the value of α contains all information of the function. In a trivial FSS scheme 1 (FIGURE 6) one can secret-share α among r parties with Shamir's (t, r)-threshold secret sharing scheme [20] .
In the scheme 1 , each party simply provides its share of α to the reconstructor, and the reconstructor recovers α and then determines f α,1 (α ). Not only the function value f α,1 (α ) but all information about f α,1 is revealed to the reconstructor. Thus, this trivial scheme is unsatisfactory though it has the optimal communication complexity of O (1) .
The existing works [7] , [8] have expected that the parties' output shares (resulting from executing Eval) for input x, i.e., (y 1 , . . . , y r ), should reveal no more information about the function f than what could be implied by f (x). That is, a function privacy requirement on the FSS schemes is desired.
Definition 8 (Function Privacy): A (t, r)-FSS scheme is function private if for each function f : D → R, there exists a PPT algorithm Sim : R → S 1 × · · · × S r such that for any x ∈ D, Sim(f (x)) ≡ (Eval (1, k 1 , x) , . . . , Eval(r, k r , x)).
To achieve function privacy, in a trivial FSS scheme 2 (FIGURE 7) one can simply secret-share the truth table of f α,1 among the r parties with Shamir's (t, r)-threshold secret sharing scheme. Each party provides a share of f (x) to the reconstructor, and the reconstructor recovers f (x) with polynomial interpolation. However, the communication complexity of this scheme will be O(n).
A. MUTUAL RATE OF ITFSS
Trivial scheme 1 shows that the parties' output shares for input x may reveal more about the secret function f than is necessary to determine f (x). In this section, we will define a parameter called mutual rate for itFSS, in order to measure the amount of information revealed by the parties' output shares of f (x). Our definition will be based on the notions of entropy and mutual information in information theory [12] .
Let X be a discrete random variable with alphabet X . Entropy is a functional of the distribution of X and measures the uncertainty of X .
Definition 9 (Entropy): The entropy H (X ) of a discrete random variable X is defined by
If |X | = n and Pr[X = x i ] = p i for every x i ∈ X , then we denote H (X ) = H (p 1 , . . . , p n ). Moreover, let H ((p 1 ) b 1 , (p 2 ) b 2 , . . . , (p i ) b i ) be the shorthand for
Suppose we wish to estimate the value of a random variable X . We observe a random variable Y with alphabet Y . It is possible that the uncertainty of X may be reduced if Y contains information about X . The conditional entropy is used VOLUME 8, 2020 to measure the entropy of a random variable, given another random variable.
Definition 10 (Conditional Entropy): The conditional entropy H (X |Y ) is defined as
Mutual information measures the amount of information that one random variable contains about another random variable, or equivalently, it is the reduction in the uncertainty of one random variable due to the knowledge of the other.
Definition 11 (Mutual Information): The mutual information of two discrete random variables X and Y is defined as
Definition 12 (Mutual Rate of itFSS):
In the itFSS of Definition 2, we denote by X the probability distribution of the function f ∈ F and denote by Y the probability distribution of the parties' output shares. The mutual rate of the itFSS is defined as
B. MUTUAL RATE OF 1
In the trivial scheme 1 for F A,B , the value of α contains all information about the point function f α,1 . We denote by X the distribution of α. When we have no information about α, we assume that X is uniformly distributed over the set [n], i.e.,
It is immediate that H (X ) = log 2 n. In the trivial scheme 1 , the reconstructor is always able to learn the value of α from the parties' output shares y. Thus, we have that
Therefore, H (X |Y ) = 0. By Equation (9), we have
C. MUTUAL RATE OF 2
Let Y be the distribution of the parties' output shares y in 2 . Let Y 1 be the set of all possible values of y, when α = α and let Y 2 be the set of all possible values of y, when α = α . It is immediate that Y 1 ∪ Y 2 is the set of all possible parties' output shares, when f α,1 is shared.
Lemma 1: Y 1 ∩ Y 2 = ∅. Proof: Suppose there exists y = (y 1 , . . . , y r ) ∈ Y 1 ∩ Y 2 . By y = (y 1 , . . . , y r ) ∈ Y 1 , we have (1, y 1 ), . . . , (r, y r ) are points on a polynomial of degree t whose constant term is 1 and by y = (y 1 , . . . , y r ) ∈ Y 2 , we have (1, y 1 ), . . . , (r, y r ) are points on a polynomial of degree t whose constant term is 0. Since t < r, we have these two polynomials are equal, which is a contradiction.
In order to compute H (X |Y ), we first compute H (X |Y = y) for every y ∈ Y 1 and every y ∈ Y 2 .
When the parties' output shares y belong to Y 1 , the reconstructor will be able to learn α immediately from y. Thus, for every y ∈ Y 1 , we have that
The lemma below enable us to compute the conditional entropy H (X |Y = y) for all y ∈ Y 2 .
Lemma 2: For any α 1 , α 2 = α and y ∈ Y 2 , we have that
Proof: For α 1 , α 2 = α , the conditional distributions of Y given that X = α 1 and X = α 2 will be identical, since they are both shares of 0 under Shamir's (t, r)-threshold secret sharing scheme. Thus, for any y
Lemma 2 shows that based on the knowledge of y ∈ Y 2 , the reconstructor can learn the probability that each element in [n] \ {α } equal to α is 1 n−1 . For every y ∈ Y 2 , we have that
n − 1 n , together with Equations (11) and (12) we have that
Therefore,
= log 2 n − n−1 n log 2 (n − 1) log 2 n = n log 2 ( n n−1 ) + log 2 (n − 1) n log 2 n
D. MUTUAL RATE OF 0
In the itFSS scheme 0 , there is a bijection between [n] and V = {v i } n i=1 . We denote by X the distribution of v α over the set V and denote by Y the distribution of the parties' output shares. In this section, we first show that the parties' output shares for an input α in 0 may reveal information about α and then calculate R 0 .
Before the parties' output shares y are learned, we can assume the probability that each element of V equal to v α is 1/n as they are all equally likely to be the value of v α . After the reconstructor learns the parties' output shares y, we show he will obtain more information about α. In particular, the value of 0 y will reveal additional information about v α , v α and thus give information about α.
Since α ∈ [n] is fixed, in the scheme 0 , the parties' output shares y = (y 1 , . . . , y r ) is determined by α and
, let Y α be the set of all possible parties' output shares. When the point function f α,1 is shared with 0 , we define Y α = y = (y 1 , . . . , y r ) :
(k 1 ,...,k r )←Gen(f α,1 ),
The set Y contains all possible parties' output shares. For every i ∈ [r] and γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ s ) ∈ F s , we have that
For any α ∈ [n] and γ ∈ F s , we denote
where
For any α ∈ [n] and γ ∈ F s , we denote by F α,γ ([r]) the vector (F α,γ (1), . . . , F α,γ (r)). Then we have that
We denote I = {−i −1 } i∈ [r] . The following lemma shows that the parties' output shares will reveal additional information about the function.
Lemma 3: If
). Note that F 1 α,γ (i) = 0 implies there exists ∈ L 1 α such that γ = −i −1 . We have 0 F α,γ ([r]) = 0 F 1 α,γ ([r]) = |I ∩ {γ } ∈L 1 α |. Let 0 = (0, . . . , 0). If y = 0, then Equation (15) and Lemma 3 jointly show that there exist α ∈ [n] and γ ∈ F s such that
Therefore, 0 y reveals information about α.
The following lemma shows that for α 1 and α 2 if v α 1 , v α = v α 2 , v α , the distribution of parties' output shares are identical.
, then for any y = (y 1 , . . . , y r ), we have
By Equations (14) and (15), we have
where |L 1 α 1 | = |L 1 α 2 | = e and |L 2 α 1 | = |L 2 α 2 | = r − e − 1. We denote by the random variable that represents γ . As γ is chosen from F s uniformly at random, F α 1 , ([r]) and F α 2 , ([r]) will be identically distributed. Therefore,
The following lemma shows that if e 1 = e 2 , then Y e 1 and Y e 2 have at most one common element, which is 0.
Lemma 5: For any e 1 , e 2 ≤ r − 1, e 1 = e 2 , we have that
Proof: Suppose there exists y = (y 1 , . . . , y r ) = 0 such that y ∈ Y e 1 ∩ Y e 2 . For any α ∈ [n], we denote F α = {F α,γ (x) : γ ∈ F s }. By Equation (14) there exist g(x) ∈ F α 1 and h(x) ∈ F α 2 such that (1, y 1 ), . . . , (r, y r ) are points on the curves g(x), h(x) respectively. Moreover, g(x) is a polynomial with e 1 nonzero roots (taking multiplicities into account) and h(x) is a polynomial with e 2 nonzero roots (taking multiplicities into account). Since deg(g(x)) = deg(h(x)) = r − 1, (1, y 1 ), . . . , (r, y r ) on the both curve implies that g(x) = h(x), which contradicts the fact that e 1 = e 2 .
Lemma 5 shows that when the parties' output shares y are learned, if y = 0, then the reconstructor can learn the value v α , v α . Let Y e = Y e \{0} for every 0 ≤ e ≤ r − 1 and let Y r = {0}. In order to compute H (X |Y ), we need to compute H (X |Y = y) for every y ∈ Y e , 0 ≤ e ≤ r. The lemma below enables us to compute the conditional entropy H (X |Y = y) for all y ∈ Y e , 0 ≤ e ≤ r − 1.
Proof:
The second equality holds by Lemma 4 and Pr
Let F = F q , where q > r + 1. For the sake of simplifying the calculation of the mutual rate of 0 , we set n = Therefore, Equation (20) enables us to obtain the mutual rate of 0 . In order to have a deeper understanding about the relation between n and R 0 , we do an experiment. In our experiment, we choose r = 3, q = 5, s ∈ {500, 550, 600, . . . , 2000} and n = s 2 . The results are shown in FIGURE 8. When s ≥ 1600, the mutual rate of 0 is below 0.1%, which means that the parties' output shares in 0 reveal only a little information about the shared function. For other itFSS based on TABLE 2, we believe that they have similar properties. It remains open whether there exists an itFSS scheme whose communication complexity and mutual rate are both smaller than those of 0 .
E. ADDING COMPUTATIONAL FUNCTION PRIVACY
The reconstruction algorithms of PIR schemes [3] , [11] , [17] compute a linear combinations of the servers' answers. We call these PIR schemes linearly reconstructible PIR schemes. We now give a generic transformation from linearly reconstructible (1, 2)-PIR schemes to computationally function private itFSS schemes.
Definition 13 (Computational Function Privacy): A (t, r)-FSS scheme is computationally function private if for each function f : D → R, there exists a PPT algorithm Sim : R → S 1 × · · · × S r such that for any x ∈ D, the distributions Sim(f (x)) and (Eval(1, k 1 , x) , · · · , Eval(r, k r , x)) are computationally indistinguishable.
Definition 14 (Linearly Reconstructible): A PIR scheme P = (Q, A, C) is said to be linearly reconstructible if the servers' answers a 1 , . . . , a r all belong to a finite field F. and there exists constants c = (c 1 , . . . , c r ) ∈ F r such that C(r, n, a 1 , . . . , a r ) = c 1 a 1 + · · · + c r a r .
Definition 15 (Linear Decoders): The output decoder DEC = (S 1 , . . . , S r , R, Dec) is said to be linear if there exist constants c = (c 1 , . . . , c r ) ∈ F r such that Dec(y 1 , . . . , y r ) = c 1 y 1 + · · · + c r y r .
(22) Our transformation see (FIGURE 9) from linearly reconstructible (1, 2)-PIR schemes to computationally function private itFSS schemes is based on the generic transformation (FIGURE 1). The main idea of obtaining computational function privacy is to generate two random elements σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ F such that Dec(σ 1 , σ 2 ) = 0 and let the i-th party add σ i to its output share in .
Theorem 4: The constructed FSS scheme * is computationally function private.
Proof: We define a simulator (Sim) as follows: 1) Choose a random element y 1 ∈ F. 2) Let y 2 = c −1 2 (f α,1 (α ) − c 1 y 1 ). 3) Output (y 1 , y 2 ). Then for any α and α ∈ [n], the distributions Sim(f α,1 (α )) and (Eval(1, k 1 , α , K ), Eval(2, k 2 , α , K )) are computationally indistinguishable, due to the security of PRF.
In Section III-B, we have obtained the most efficient (1, 2)-itFSS by applying our transformation to the PIR scheme of [3] . Actually, by applying the generic transformation ( * ) to this PIR scheme, we shall obatain an itFSS scheme, which is computationally function private. An interesting question is whether we can obtain a computationally function private (t, r)-itFSS scheme from a (t, r)-PIR scheme for r ≥ 3.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we study itFSS and propose a generic transformation from information-theoretic PIR schemes to itFSS schemes. By applying this transformation to the existing PIR schemes, we get (t, r)-itFSS schemes for a variety of choices of (t, r). The resulting itFSS schemes have both informationtheoretic security and low communication complexity. We also study the property of function privacy. We introduce a new parameter called mutual rate for itFSS. By calculating the mutual rate for several itFSS schemes, we can successfully measure the amount of information about f that will be revealed in each execution of the itFSS schemes. When r = 2, we propose a transformation from 2-server PIR to 2-party itFSS schemes with computational function privacy. LIANG FENG ZHANG received the Ph.D. degree in cryptography and information security from Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is currently an Assistant Professor with the School of Information Science and Technology, ShanghaiTech University, Shanghai, China. His main research interest focuses on the design of protocols for secure multiparty computation problems, such as the private information retrieval and the verifiable computation. VOLUME 8, 2020 
